Jensen (2012) extended this line of research by finding the ESEE in cases where the central protagonist (a) implements a corporate restructuring plan that either increases or decreases sales in New Jersey for the next quarter, (b) implements a new profit-increasing policy at a movie studio that makes movies either better or worse from an artistic standpoint, or (c) makes organizational changes at a corporation that either fulfills or violates a racial identification law in Nazi Germany. In other words, Beebe and Jensen found that individuals were more likely to attribute knowledge to a protagonist whose action was bad in some respect than to a nearly equivalent protagonist whose action was good or neutral.
The ESEE has important consequences for understanding the Knobe effect because most of the scholars who have proposed explanations of the effect base their explanations upon the assumption that the chairman knows that the side-effects in the help and the harm conditions will occur. Hugh McCann (2005, 739) , for example, writes, "The situation of Knobe's chairman, however, is not one of negligence: in both vignettes, he knows perfectly well what he is doing." Many other scholars have followed suit, viewing the side-effects as being "anticipated" or "foreseen."
5 But if participants are not equally inclined to attribute knowledge to the chairman in the contrasting conditions, explanations of why they asymmetrically attribute intentionality that are based upon this erroneous assumption will likely be incorrect.
The ESEE also has the potential to change our understanding of the nature of knowledge.
If individuals are not making an error when they allow the goodness or badness of an action undertaken in light of the belief that p to affect their judgments about whether someone knows that p, then epistemologists will have one more non-epistemic factor-in addition to stakes-to 5 E.g., Knobe (2003a, 190; 2004; 2006) , Knobe & Burra (2006) consider incorporating into their analyses of knowledge. However, several philosophical and empirical challenges must be answered before such a move can be fully warranted.
Jonathan Weinberg (2014) has suggested that the size of the ESEE is "not terribly dramatic, and thus would be better evidence that the Knobe effect is here a source of noise, not signal, concerning what knowledge really is or isn't." However, the effect observed by Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) was medium in size (r = .35), and when Beebe and Jensen (2012) reran Beebe and Buckwalter's experiment using a forced-choice ('the chairman knows' vs. 'the chairman doesn't know') answer format and a Likert scale that ranged from 1 to 7 instead of from -3 to 3, they observed large effect sizes in both cases (r's = .51 and .7). While these findings raise important questions about what the effect size for the ESEE really is, the size of the observed effects strongly suggests that the ESEE is more than mere noise.
Another question that has arisen in the discussion of the ESEE is whether the effect might result from the fact that it is often easier to make things worse than it is to make things better. If, for example, the probability of succeeding in harming the environment is higher than the probability of succeeding in helping it, it would be easier for the chairman to know that his actions will harm the environment than for him to know that he will help it. Thus, standard presentations of the chairman and the environment case may err in assuming that the chairman's epistemic position with respect to the belief in question is equally strong in both conditions. If this is correct, the ESEE will have nothing of substance to teach us about the folk conception of knowledge, since such lessons seem to depend upon the situations depicted being epistemically equivalent.
Despite the prima facie plausibility of this line of thinking, Nikolaus Dalbauer and Andreas Hergovich (2013) found that the goodness or badness of an outcome affects the probability judgments that participants make about those outcomes and that it does so independently of whatever background beliefs participants might hold about how easy it is to harm or help the environment. Furthermore, when Beebe and Jensen (2012) modified the chairman and the environment vignette so that participants were told there was either a slight chance that the environment would be harmed or a very strong chance that it would be helped, participants were still more inclined to attribute knowledge in the harm condition than in the help condition. Together, these findings suggest that unbiased assessments of the relative probabilities of the good and bad outcomes are not what lie behind the ESEE.
A common explanation of the Knobe effect is that individuals' motivation to blame the chairman for harming the environment has a distorting effect upon individuals' intentionality attributions. Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006) and Mark Alicke (2008), for example, suggest that unconscious, spontaneous processes associated with blame attribution lead participants to exaggerate the chairman's causal control over the negative environmental outcome and to lower the evidential standards for blaming him, which makes it easier to attribute intentionality to him.
In other words, blame attribution processes distort intentionality attribution processes. Fred Adams and Annie Steadman (2004a Steadman ( , 2004b ) also suggest that blame plays a central role in generating the Knobe effect, noting that an assertion of 'You did that intentionally' often serves the function of implicating that someone is to blame, even if the semantic content of 'intentionally' does not include blame as a component. In a similar fashion, it seems that 'The chairman knew the environment would be harmed' can implicate that he is to blame for his action. If denying that he knew this would happen generates the implicature that the chairman is not to blame for his action, this might increase knowledge attributions in the harm condition.
Even if someone was not consciously engaged in implicating blame, unconscious blame processes might nonetheless distort individuals' judgments about who knows what, thereby producing the ESEE. Although this line of thinking has some initial plausibility, significant empirical challenges to it have been raised in the literature.
For example, Jonathan Schaffer and Knobe (2012, n. 10) report that they asked participants about the knowledge of a neutral, third-party observer that they added to Knobe's original environment vignette, viz., "an environmentalist who knew that scientists were predicting helpful or harmful effects and then learned about the chairman's decision to go ahead with the program." Participants were more inclined to say the environmentalist knew that the environment would be harmed than they were to say that he knew it would be helped. One hypothesis that purports to explain a wider range of data than the blame-based account is the 'belief heuristic' approach articulated by Mark Alfano, Beebe, and Brian Robinson (2012) . They argue that agents whose actions violate normative expectations are more likely to engage in deeper levels of reflection about the consequences of their actions than agents who do not violate such expectations. They write:
[T]rue beliefs to the effect that one is violating a norm are typically more valuable than true beliefs to the effect that one is conforming to a norm. One may be sanctioned for violating a norm, so forming a true belief about whether one has violated a norm (hence potentiating such a sanction) is valuable, regardless of whether one endorses the norm.
The chairman in the HELP condition, for example, does not need to say to himself, "Wait! I need to stop and think carefully about whether helping the environment is something that I should be doing." In the HARM condition, however, an inner monologue like this might well be appropriate. (Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson 2012, 269) Increased reflection about consequences-even by praiseworthy agents-makes it more likely that agents who violate normative expectations will form stronger beliefs and come to have knowledge about the consequences of their actions and that attributors will reasonably interpret them as having done so. However, it remains to be seen how well the belief heuristic approach will fare as additional data comes in.
One way that the robustness of the ESEE has shown itself is that the badness of actions has been observed to override other considerations that upon reflection should militate against the attribution of knowledge. For example, Beebe and Shea (2013), Buckwalter (2014b), and Turri (2014) all found that participants were more willing to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases that included some kind of wrongdoing than in Gettier cases that did not. Beebe and Shea took the chairman and the environment case and 'Gettiered' it by giving the chairman a justified true belief but prevented the justification and truth from being related in the expected fashion. They also adapted well-known thought experiments from the Gettier problem literature and introduced
